Heiner Perrey, Martin Landsmann, Osman Ugus, Matthias Wählisch, Thomas C. Schmidt,
TRAIL: Topology Authentication in RPL,
In: Proc. of ACM Intern. Conf. on Embedded Wireless Systems and Networks (EWSN), New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016.
Abstract: The IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) was recently introduced as the new routing standard for the Internet of Things. Although RPL defines basic security modes, it remains vulnerable to topological attacks which facilitate blackholing, interception, and resource exhaustion. We are concerned with analyzing the corresponding threats and protecting future RPL deployments from such attacks. In this paper, we derive and evaluate TRAIL, a generic scheme for topology authentication in RPL. TRAIL solely relies on the basic assumptions of RPL that (1) the root node serves as a trust anchor and (2) each node interconnects to the root as part of a hierarchy. Using proper reachability tests, TRAIL scalably and reliably identifies any topological attacker with little cryptographic efforts.
Note: accepted for publication
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